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ABSTRACT 
 This study estimates four different domestic industrial learning externalities of and between 
imitation and innovation. Using highly disaggregated industrial data as measures for product 
varieties, we test for the relationship between imitation and innovation based on four 
theoretically informed, policy-relevant hypotheses. In sum, we document robust and 
statistically significant stepping-stone effect of imitation on innovation, and a reverse positive 
creative-imitation effect from innovation to imitation. Likewise, we also estimate positive 
within-sectorial learning effects for both innovation and imitation. These empirical findings 
have significant implications for industrial policies designed to foster innovation-driven growth, 
especially in middle-income and developing economies. 
 
 
JEL Classification Numbers: O11, O40, O47 






 At the nascent stage of economic development, many well-intended policymakers in 
emerging economies understood how to go about designing an effective industrial policy, 
which can be broadly classified into import-substituting industrialisation, export-oriented 
industrialisation, resource-based industrialisation, and export processing zones (Low and Tijaja 
2013). By promoting both domestic and inward foreign investments, as well as improving the 
overall climate for doing business, many developing economies managed to position 
themselves into the lower ends of the global production value chain and consequently, develop 
an industrial base characterized primarily by labour-intensive, low value-added manufacturing 
based on imitated foreign technology. Over the past 60 years, the successful implementation of 
such industrialisation strategy has contributed to many developing economies growing quickly 
out of poverty gap to attain middle-income status. 
 However, having achieved middle-income status, policymakers then find it much harder to 
push the economy into high-income status based on previous strategy. Over the 1960-2018 
periods, only 16 out of 182 economies have successfully reached high-income status (Cherif 
and Hasanov 2019). Indeed, most emerging economies, including previous high performers 
such as Malaysia (Zeufack and Lim 2013), have faced problems with sustaining the 
competitiveness of their manufacturing industries.
2
 With most emerging economies expect to 
enter a decade of moderate external demand, growth must therefore increasingly spring from 
knowledge, innovation, and a deeper stock of physical and human capital domestically, by 
promoting firms to learn to do new things---venturing into unfamiliar export industries for 
example---and to do things in new ways. (Commission on Growth and Development 2008). In 
short, developing-economy policymakers ought to promote domestic industrial transformation 
through industrial upgrading from imitation-reliance to indigenous innovation-driven. 
While the broad direction of an increasingly domestic-driven industrial policies is clear, 
there is a knowledge gap in terms of understanding the precise mechanisms (and their 
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respective magnitudes) affecting industrial transformation. For instance, South Korea and 
Taiwan are two economies with very different industrial strategies [the former dominated by 
large Chaebols and the latter driven by small and medium enterprises (SMEs)], which suggest 
vastly different industrial dynamics. Similarly, between the neighbouring Singapore and 
Malaysia, the former built an industry dominated by multinationals operating at the 
technological frontier (hence, growing via expansion of innovation varieties), whereas the 
latter is driven by large government-linked companies, which serve as industrial innovation 
leaders that inspire imitation activities for the rest of the firms.
3
 In Chandra et al (2012), these 
various learning-by-doing channels in the manufacturing industries are identified as being 
driven by the dynamics of imitation and innovation variety expansions, à la Romer (1990), as 
well as their mutual interaction effects, dated even back to the Industrial Revolution era. Indeed, 
to reap the benefits from learning-by-doing and knowledge spillovers within- and 
between-industries would necessitate the implementation of strategic industrial policies 
(Harrison and Rodriguez-Clare 2010; Günther and Alcorta 2011), hence reaffirming the 
endogeneity of these issue: accurate estimates of the learning effects within and between 
innovation and imitation are key to inform effective industrial policy design, but good 
industrial policy would promote these learning effects. 
The main purpose of this study is to model and estimate these different learning-by-doing 
mechanisms. On a macro-, aggregate level, we identify four endogenous knowledge 
externality channels that are of industrial policy significance. First, knowledge can be acquired 
and grow by producing new products, be it from adopting the standardized processes of foreign 
products (imitation growth) or from the new products developed domestically (innovation 
growth). Both of these are termed standing-on-shoulder effects (Caballero and Jaffe 1993; 
Jones 2005), and characterized the industrial growth experience described for South Korea. 
Further, firms that started off as imitators of foreign processes can eventually undergo an 
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upgrade in technological capability, and then transit to developing new product varieties. This 
learning mechanism that goes from imitation to innovation is known as the stepping-stone 
effect (Glass 1999; Collins 2015). This corresponds to the industrial learning experience of 
Taiwan, which started off with a network of SMEs, and some of them have eventually 
progressed to becoming global frontier innovators in their respective industries. Lastly, 
consistent with the described Malaysian experience, a fourth spillover mechanism can take 
place from innovation to imitation activities, as in studies such as Mukoyama (2003) and Lim 
(2019). Knowledge of the significance of these industrial spillover externality, notably 
econometric estimation of the magnitudes of these learning-by-doing mechanisms, would 
contribute towards better understanding of industrial policies in developing economies, as well 
as informing their significance in driving the various stages of development of developing 
economies (Funke and Strulik 2000; Agénor and Dinh 2013). For examples, if the 
stepping-stone effect is insignificant, do policymakers in up-and-coming countries, such as the 
East African Community economies, still follow the standard prescription of export-oriented 
industrialisation? Likewise, if the standing-on-shoulder effects is weak for the innovation 
sector, does that mean the offshoring and technological migration activities by multinationals 
do more harm in destabilizing domestic industrial development than good? These are pertinent 
questions to industrial policies, and will inform the respective roles of innovation and imitation 
in driving the various stages of development in developing economies (Funke and Strulik 2000; 
Agénor and Dinh 2013). Despite the significance to industrial policy design globally, based on 




To preview, using the highly disaggregated industrial data, INDSTAT 4 released by the 
United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO), this study is the first to 
empirically establish the presence of a positive stepping-stone effect across countries. Further, 
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by estimating a positive effect of innovative variety on the expansion of imitative varieties, we 
also find empirical evidence in support of a complementary relationship between innovative 
and imitative industrial varieties. These are significant for the design of industrial policies as 
they suggest that the development of both imitative and innovative variety-based industries is 
important irrespective of the development stage an economy is in. This is in contrast to a usual 
misconception that middle-income economies ought to seek out only the firms that are in the 
technological frontier when designing their industrial and FDI strategies. 
The rest of the article is structured as follows. In Section 2, the key features of our 
theoretical model are described and summarized (see Appendix A for more formal and 
elaborative presentation of the model). Section 3 derives an estimate-able empirical structure 
for the theoretical model. This is then followed by Section 4, which discusses the empirical 
strategy and the estimation results. Section 5 concludes by discussing some further policy 
implications. 
 
2. Theoretical Model 
2.1  Households 
To provide theoretical basis to our empirical estimation, we develop a theoretical model 
describing industrial transformation in the form of expanded varieties, based on Agénor and 
Dinh (2013) and Lim (2019). The model economy is populated by individuals with identical 
preferences but different innate abilities, who live for two periods. Population is constant at N . 
Abilities, a  0, 1 , are instantly observable and assumed to be uniformly distributed. At 
the beginning of adulthood, individuals choose whether to spend a fraction   0, 1  and 
training cost, tct , to undergo training. This decision determines the proportion of skilled and 
unskilled workers. It is optimal for an individual with ability at  am , 1 to train and 
become skilled if and only if their life-long indirect utility of being skilled (V t
S
) outweighs that 
of being unskilled (V t
U
), with the indirect utility function given by  
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Vt





, h  U, S, j  0, 1.   #   
              (1) 
As shown in Appendix A, a theoretical threshold ability,at
C
, above which individuals 
choose to remain unskilled can be derived, which is then used to determine the proportion of 
unskilled, t
U
, and effective skilled labour,  t
S
. This theoretical specification is consistent with 
cross-country evidence, where innovation tends to correlate with the expansion of skilled 
workers via enhanced education quality (Hanushek and Kimko 2000; Vandenbussche et al 
2006; Maloney and Rodriquez-Clare 2007).  
2.2  Production 
First, there is a final good sector populated by a continuum of perfectly competitive, 
profit-maximizing firms. These firms employ Nt
U
 unskilled labour in the economy. For each 
firm, production uses untrained labour, private capital (K t
P
), and a composite intermediate 
input, which in a symmetric equilibrium, is written as  
        




x s,tI ds  MtIx tI  and 0
Mt
R
x s,tR ds  MtRx tR . These reflect the aggregate 
innovative varieties (Mt
R
), imitative varieties (Mt
I
), and the respective quantity of intermediate 
goods (IGs), x i,s,t , with s  0, Mt . As shown in Appendix A, after solving for the 
first-order conditions, and upon imposing certain theoretical restrictions on the congestion 
parameters, we can write the aggregate output of the economy in a standard AK-form of 
Yt  fmtR, mtI; kGKtP . This expresses final good as a function of effective innovative 
varieties (m t
R
), effective imitative varieties (m t
I
), and an exogenously given level of effective 








, kG  K G/Kt
P
. By 
definition, this specification is consistent with industrial policies in developing economies, 
where the government plays a direct role in influencing industrial activities. The 
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capital-intensive specification to variables are also consistent with the long-term growth 
experienced observed worldwide for developing economies. 
 The final good sector is supported two different but symmetric production structures 
modelled in similar fashion to Gustafsson and Segerstrom (2010). Specifically, there are two 
sets of monopolistically-competitive IG producers: those producing imitation-based inputs 
using blueprints from the imitation sector, and those producing innovation-based inputs, based 
on blueprints from the innovation sector. 
 The blueprints are produced in two sectors: an innovative sector, which employs skilled 
labour, in quantity N t
S
, to produce variety, Mt
R
, and an imitation sector, which employs a 
constant share of unskilled labour, 1  NtU  to produce variety, MtI . The aggregate 
technology in the imitation sector is define as 
  
Mt1




                      (3) 
where At
I  AMtI; MtR; kG  is a productivity parameter determining the degree of 
knowledge spillover. To capture the policy context of our model, this specification includes a 
direct learning effect from stock of imitation (Mt
I
) documented empirically by Ang and 
Madsen (2015a), and the spillover effect from innovation (Mt
R
), as in Lim (2019). In addition, 
as in Agénor and Neanidis (2015), a positive productivity effect from access to public capital 
(kG ) is also specified. Profit maximisation by imitative firms yields the first-order condition 
for the unskilled wage, w t
U
. 
 On the other hand, the aggregate technology in the innovation sector is defined as 
  
Mt1
R  MtR  AtR
1  NtS
Nt
,   #   
               (4) 
where At
R  AMtR; MtI; kG  is the corresponding productivity parameter, which depends 
again on the direct learning effect from existing stock of innovative variety, the stepping-stone 
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effect discussed in the Introduction (Glass 1999; Collins 2015), and the effective public capital 
stock. Given that skilled labour are employed in innovation, profit maximisation by innovative 
firms yields the first-order condition for skilled wage, w t
S
. 
2.3  Government & Market-clearing Conditions 
The government taxes only wages. A constant fraction of government revenue is spent on 
public capital investment, G t
I
, and the remaining on all other non-productive spending, G t
O
. 
It is assumed that the government cannot borrow. Specifically,  
       
Gt   Gth  hwtUNtU  1  wtS  tctNtS, h  I, O,   #   
      (5) 
where h  0, 1 , i i  1 . 
 Both the skilled and unskilled labour markets clear. The saving-investment balance also 
holds for the private capital stock. 
 
 
3. Empirical form and hypothesis formulation 
The dynamic and balanced growth equilibriums of the model are defined in Appendix A, 
which are followed by analytical solutions. The dynamic form of the solution can be condensed 
into a 2x2 first-order linear difference equation system in log-deviations from the steady state,  
m t
R  ln mt
R
 and m t



















.   #   





 are interpretable as the respective aggregate standing-on-shoulder effects, 
1
I
 the stepping-stone effect, and R
2
 the spillover effect from innovation to imitation, 
dubbed creative imitation effects. With Yt  and K t
P
 growing at the same rate along the 
balanced growth path, we can then write the long-run growth rate as depending on the imitative 
varieties, the innovative varieties, and public capital. As motivated in the Introduction, the 
9 
 
coefficients represent four key knowledge spillover channels of significance in the context of 
industrial policy. For endogeneity considerations, these spillover channels are jointly estimated 
empirically, with the benchmark empirical setup represented by: 
     
i n n o vjt  0  1 innov jt1  2imit jt  3 imit jt1  4pubcapjt






m Zm ,jt  jt  ujt,
  #   
       (7) 
       
i m i tjt  0  1 innov jt  2 innov jt1  3 imit jt1  4pubcapjt 






m Zm ,jt  jt  v jt,
  #   
     (8) 
      
p u b c a pj,t  0  1u r b a njt  2popdensjt  
m1
n1
m Zm ,jt  jt  zjt,   #   
   (9) 
         
gj,t  0  1 i n i t G D Pjt  2 innov jt  3 imit jt  4pubcapjt
 5innov jt  6imit jt  
k1
K
kk,jt  jt  jt,
  #   
       (10) 
where j(t) is a country (time) index; innov jt  and imit jt  are innovative and imitative varieties;  
pubcapj,t  is public capital stock; gj,t  is growth rate of per capita real GDP; initGDPjt  is the 
logarithm of initial per capita GDP (introduced to capture the conditional convergence effects). 
In line with Agénor and Neanidis (2015), we also examine the contemporaneous effects 
between the two main endogenous variables, introduce urban shares and population density in 
the equation for public capital stock, and use Zm ,jtm1
n1
, a set of fiscal variables in levels 





 denote the set of control variables for the industrial 
knowledge production functions and economic growth. Lastly, jt  captures time-invariant 
country-specific effects, whereas ujt , v jt , zjt , jt  are the error terms. 
Hypothesis 1: The aggregate standing-on-shoulder effects of accumulated knowledge on 
production are positive for both industrial varieties.  
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 Hypothesis 1 is motivated by a straightforward policy consideration that, the output effects 
of industrial expansion ought to be positive over time, as long as an industry is growing and the 
firms are building technological capacity through manufacturing. In a cross-country estimation, 
we expect these two effects to be positive, or else a fundamental rethinking the global 
industrial development philosophy would be required. However, a plausible scenario is that of 
statistical insignificance. Statistically insignificant estimates of the learning externalities would 
suggest, on average, the lack of industrial stability over time, likely due to frequent reallocation 
of production plants and offshoring activities by multinationals. Overly high frequency of 
product switching within industries could also cause a lack of learning effects from existing 
stock, therefore harming growth.    
Hypothesis 2: The stepping-stone effect from imitation to innovation is positive, (α2 + α3) / (1- 
α1) > 0. Also, α2 > 0 would indicate positive contemporaneous relationship.  
 Hypothesis 2 is key to the understanding of development policy. The central tenet of 
exports-oriented industrialisation policy, such as the Flying geese model (Kojima 2000) 
popularized during the Asian Miracle era, is premised on a developing economy being able to 
first build up industrial base by exporting goods for which it has comparative advantage. At the 
early stage of development, this means imitative products. As an economy successfully builds 
up its knowledge base and is able to conduct indigenous innovation, as in the case of Taiwan, 
then the stepping-stone effect is positive. Nevertheless, as mentioned in Introduction, many 
other developing economies have failed in translating export-oriented industrialisation to 
sustained productivity growth, with firms unable to successfully upgrade their technological 
capabilities. As such, estimating the magnitude of the learning effect from imitation to 
innovation, controlling for relevant fixed effects across countries, would go a long way towards 
informing industrial policy design. Is there still economic rationale for a developing economy 
to first build up an industrial base on the bottom rung of the global production value chain? 
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The result from the testing of Hypothesis 2 will inform this.       
Hypothesis 3: The creative-imitation effect, that is, the knowledge spillover from innovation 
to imitation is zero, 1  2/3  0 . 
After the well-documented failure of import-substituting industrialisation in Latin America 
in the 1960-70s, there is scepticism that there is limitation to the spillover from innovation to 
imitation if a developing economy were to create an internal market, and allows domestic 
industrial leaders' innovation in driving growth for the rest of the domestic firms engaging in 
standardization. Indeed, firm-level empirical studies have found conflicting results of this 
learning mechanism.
5
 Yet, some notable developing economies, especially the resource-rich 
ones like Malaysia, pursue a type of resource-based industrialisation policy, predicated on the 
belief that, within the domestic market the learning effect from innovation to imitation is large 
enough. To some extent, South Korea's Chaebol model fits the mould too, where the domestic 
knowledge spillover from innovation by the largest Chaebols is believed to generate large 
enough knowledge spillover to drive imitation activities by smaller players in the economy.  
Hypothesis 4: The comparative strength of the domestic industrial learning externalities is 
different for countries in different stages of development. 
Hypothesis 4 concerns a fundamental development policy question: Should country in 
different development stages place different focus in domestic industrial development? 
Intuitively, we would expect low-income economies to have significant standing-on-shoulder 
learning effects in imitation but not innovation; middle-income economies are likely to 
experience the strongest stepping-stone effect from imitation to innovation; high-income 
economies to have largest standing-on-shoulder learning effects in innovation. Knowledge of 
these effects would then inform policymakers of their industrial policy preferences. Lastly, the 
δs allow us to compare the stock and flow effects of imitation and innovation on long-run 
growth. Though the public capital equation is estimated as in Agénor and Neanidis (2015), the 
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coefficients associated with public capital are not of main interest, but they allow for an 
empirical validation of the effects of infrastructure push on stimulating industrial expansion. 
 
4. Empirical Analysis 
4.1 Data and Measurements 
 The key challenge in this study is in constructing the measures for imitative and innovative 
varieties. In the existing literature, innovation is mainly measured by patent applications while 
imitation by trademarks or employment. While patent data is a good measure for innovation, 
the proxies used for imitation and product variety are often flawed. Conceptually, the use of 
measures such as R&D employment as a proxy for product variety is no longer valid once the 
scale effect is adjusted for. For another popular measure, the input measure of R&D 
expenditure, it is well-documented in the empirical literature to have failed in explaining 
innovation-driven productivity growth. The direct use of a product space-based measure is 
therefore essential. 
 The INDSTAT 4 dataset released by UNIDO provides us with sufficiently long 
disaggregated industrial data across countries. While INDSTAT 4 is an imperfect measure, it is 
the most disaggregated pure domestic industrial variety data.
6
 This, coupled with the 
progression in product sophistication studies such as Hausmann et al (2007), allows us to 
examine empirically the interactions of imitation and innovation—as semi-symmetric ideas 
production functions—directly. We employ a bottom-up approach by constructing the 
measures using disaggregated industrial data from the UNIDO database of INDSTAT-4 2019 
Revision 3, down to the 4-digit level of ISIC. While databases such as Spain's Encuesta Sobre 
Estrategias Empresariales, or more generally, trade data based on the World Customs 
Organization's Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding Systems has more detailed 
product classification (potentially up to the 10-digit level), in terms of product classification, 
we use the UNIDO database for two reasons. Firstly, our titled aim of cross-country estimation 
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is mainly focuses on estimating the different dynamics associated with broad-based industrial 
transformation within an economy. Secondly, the focus is on the evolution of industrial 
development rather than trade policy, for which trade data will usually provide more insights. 
In this respect, while imperfect, the UNIDO database offers the best available data for the 
purposes of this study. Another concern is the classification of industries as imitative and 
innovative. To minimize arbitrariness and to ensure robustness, six different pairs of imitative 
and innovative varieties are constructed using a bottom-up approach. Two of these 
(Innov1-Imit1 and Innov2-Imit2) are based on OECD's technology intensity classification of 
manufacturing industries, where the first pairing considers only the high-tech ISICs as 
innovative varieties while the second pairing includes both high- and medium-high tech ISICs 
as innovative varieties. One pair, Innov3-Imit3, is based on the primary industrial baskets of 
leading innovative economies as defined by the country ranking of Global Innovation Index 
(INSEAD 2017).
7
 Finally, three pairs are based on an income-based product sophistication 
index constructed based on a similar approach to the PRODY measure of Hausmann et al 
(2007). Contrary to PRODY, our index is a production-based, weighted-average of the per 
capita GNIs of countries producing a given product variety, and so it represents the income 
level associated with said ISICs.
8
 
 The constructed index ranks all the 4-digit ISICs along a continuum of income-based 
sophistication values, which then allows us to classify these ISICs using World Bank's 2016 
income-level cut-off values in grouping countries by income level. Specifically, given that the 
per capita GNI numbers used in constructing the index are based on the Atlas method, we 
categorize the 4-digit ISICs to four groups: high-, upper-middle-, lower-middle, and 
low-income. After that, three innovation-imitation pairings are constructed: (i) Innov4-Imit4: 
only ISICs with high-income values are considered innovative, while only the ISICs with 
upper-middle-income values are considered imitation (dropping the rest); (ii) Innov5-Imit5: 
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only ISICs with high-income values are considered innovative, but ISICS with both upper- and 
lower-middle-income values constitute imitation; and (iii) Innov6-Imit6: innovation includes 
ISICs with high- and upper-middle income values, and imitation constitutes the rest. Further 
descriptions of the six pairs of innovative-imitative variety measures, as well as the 
income-based industrial production sophistication index, are summarized in Table B1 and B2.
9
 
 For the benchmark analysis, the innovative and imitative varieties are proxied by the total 
value added of the ISIC at 4-digit level. In other words, we measure innovation and imitation 
using a bottom-up aggregate measure, assuming each 4-digit ISIC as a different type of product 
variety, with the respective values being the values of the variety types. For further robustness, 
for each of these six pairs, we repeat the same estimation exercise using two additional 
measures, which include the logarithm of output per employee and value added per employee. 
Strictly speaking, the two per worker measures are more productivity based measures than raw 
varieties. However, given the stationary nature of the variables, m t
R
 and m t
I
 in the dynamic 
system, the variety per worker measures do allow for some additional robustness checks to our 
benchmark estimation. 
 On the other variables, to measure public capital, we use two indicators: (i) a direct use of 
the recently published public capital stock data from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), 
and (ii) all telephone (including cellular) lines. The former is by definition the stock of public 
capital, while the latter is a telecommunication based public infrastructure measure that is 
commonly used as a proxy for advanced infrastructure (Rӧller and Waverman 2001; Esfahani 
and Ramrez 2003).
10
 In line with Ang and Madsen (2013, 2015a, 2015b), we use the gross 
tertiary enrolment rate as a proxy for the skilled workforce. While they capture knowledge 
spillovers through imports, given that our specification focuses on domestic industrial 
transformation, we use FDI inflows instead as a controlling variable. In the growth equation, in 
addition to the stock effects, we also model the flows effects for both innovation and imitation. 
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The remaining controls are standard variables employed in cross-country growth regressions, 
drawn from sources such as the World Bank World Development Indicators, the various 
statistical databases of the International Monetary Fund, and the UNESCO database for 
educational statistics. Further details on these variables are also presented in Table B1. 
 Our data is an unbalanced panel, spanning 91 countries for the period 1990-2016, with a 
total of 1,070 observations. However, for some countries, there are missing observations in 
between the years. The chosen time period is largely restricted by data availability in the 
INDSTAT-4 database. Following standard approach of growth regressions, we construct 3-year 
period averages (1990-92, 1993-95, ..., 2014-16) to minimize business cycle effects. While this 
leaves us with T = 9, the reasonably large N means we have a maximum sample size of 495 
observations. However, in actual implementation, when the use of lags as instruments and the 
differencing in (10) are accounted for, this drops significantly to a range of 205–332 
observations. We prioritize estimating equations (7)-(10) as a system. Given the disparity of 
INDSTAT-4 data across countries, the system-GMM approach of Blundell and Bond (1998) is 
applied in favour of the difference-GMM estimator, since the latter is susceptible to 
weak-instruments problem and is less efficient for data with many panels and few periods. In 
addition, given the importance of joint-estimation, we also apply the three-stage-least-squares 
(3SLS) estimator, controlling for country and time fixed effects. 
4.2 Empirical Results 
 To examine the four hypotheses, we start off by using total value added in the benchmark 
regressions, with the empirical results (for the six combinations of variety and two public 
capital measures) presented in Tables 1-3. For the system-GMM estimation, we treat the 
non-public capital control variables as exogenous. This is mainly to address the too many 
instruments problem (Roodman 2009), where an excessive number of instruments can result in 
overfitting of the instrumented variables, therefore biasing the results. While the choice of the 
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Blundell-Bond estimator does partly mitigate the weak-instruments problem associated with 
difference-GMM, we restrict the lagged variable used as instruments to one period. Further, we 
also follow Agénor and Neanidis (2015), where the number of instruments is kept less than the 
number of countries and subject the empirical model to various robustness tests. Since we use 
one-period lagged terms, the validity of the instruments can be verified indirectly by applying 
the Arellano and Bond (1991) test for serial correlation up to two lags. Hansen (1982) J-test of 
overidentifying restrictions is also applied to check for the exogeneity of the instruments. A 
two-step estimator is applied, hence the use of the Windmeijer robust standard errors 
(Windmeijer 2005). The outlined strategy with respect to system-GMM estimation allows us to 
reduce the risk of potential over-identification. However, the flip side is that the relatively 
restrictive criterion, coupled with the nature of an instrumented approach, means we have an 
increasing chance of poorly-fitting a model, hence obtaining statistically insignificant estimates. 
The use of 3SLS estimation is to partly mitigate this by providing a complementary approach. 
Lastly, the benchmark estimations of all four hypotheses are also subject to a battery of 
robustness tests, where the estimation is repeated using productivity measures such as output 
per employee and value added per employee. The estimated coefficients of the 4 industrial 
learning externalities are largely robust to the various specifications. These are summarized in 
Appendix B (Tables B3-B8).  
 For Hypothesis 1, the standing-on-shoulder learning effects are found for both innovative 
and imitative varieties. Specifically, out of the 24 sets of results in the benchmark estimation, 
we observe statistically significant positive estimates for standing-on-shoulder effects in 21 of 
the estimated coefficients: average elasticity values of 0.725 and 0.744 for innovative and 
imitative varieties respectively (0.661 and 0.714) if we included the non-significant estimates; 
0.579 and 0.668 if only system-GMM estimations are considered). Although these are lower 
than the 0.99 estimated by Ang and Madsen (2015a), we account for endogeneity between 
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imitation and innovation. In terms of policy implications, these estimates reaffirm the current 
policy consensus that within-sector learning and technological capability-buildings are 
important. To an extent, the findings also further invalidate Trump's frequent claims that trade 
protectionism is necessary, since organically industrial activities would lead to knowledge 
accumulation and subsequently, further expansion in industrial varieties. Nevertheless, a caveat 
is noted from the robustness testing implemented (see Appendix B), where the estimated 
coefficients have much lower statistical significance when the per employee numbers are used 
with system-GMM approach (12 out of the 24 estimated  1  using system-GMM) are not 
significant at the ten-percent level. 
 More interestingly for developing-economy policies, the testing of Hypothesis 2 reveals 
statistically significant stepping-stone effect. All the estimates for the contemporaneous 
coefficient, 2 , are positive and statistically significant, at an average of 0.872. All but five 
estimates of the lagged term, 3 , are significant too, which together with the contemporaneous 
term, gives an estimated average stepping-stone effect of 0.255. However, if we were to 
consider only the statistically significant estimates, the average drops to 0.153. In addition, for 
a more dynamic context to the stepping-stone effect, the associated multiplier effect is also 
calculated, which yields an average of 0.948.
11
 Unlike for Hypothesis 1, the robustness testing 
in Appendix B reaffirms these results. This shows that the long-run impact of imitative 
industrial expansion on the innovative industries is positive, with a one-percent increase in 
imitative variety believed to translate to just slightly below a one-percent increase in innovative 
variety over the long run. This provides actual quantitative support to export-oriented 
industrialisation in developing economies, which to date remains a contentious issue among 
policymakers.  
 For Hypothesis 3, the contemporaneous effect of the industrial learning externality from 
innovation to imitation is estimated at 0.845; though after accounting for the lagged terms, we 
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have an average creative-imitation effect of 0.210. The dynamic multiplier associated with this 
creative-imitation effect is also calculated at 0.650, which is surprisingly, positive. These are 
robust to the additional estimates in Appendix B too. The positive value indicates that 
innovative and imitative varieties are complements, and the expansion in innovative industries 
does not crowd out lower-tech industries. In the context of industrial policy design, 
policymakers ought to recognize that industrial development ought to be broad-based. Any 
formulation of a long-term industrial development plan should place joint emphasis on both 
innovative and imitative industries. Given that the inherent learning effect from innovation to 
imitation is positive, the focus of industrial policy therefore needs to be on emphasizing on 
uplifting the “capacities of smaller firms to absorb technical knowledge and processes” (Gill 
and Kharas 2007). Likewise, when this result is interpreted together with the results in the 
growth equation (positive 5 , 6 ; negative 2 , 3 ), we argue that industrial policy emphasis 
needs to be network-based, in that, the maximisation of knowledge flows are more important 
than stock-based policies, which corroborates the theoretical findings of Dinopoulos and 
Thompson (1998) and Perez-Sebastian (2007). As an example, instead of worrying about low 
patents filing statistics, for developing economies, industrial policies should emphasis on 
applied research productivity, where the adoption of collaborative arrangement such as the 
Triple Helix (Etzkowitz 2008), to promote university-public sector-firm technology sharing 
and transfer, would unleash the multi-facets of expansion across all industrial varieties.           
 To test for Hypothesis 4, we repeat the same estimation exercises using annual intervals, 
mainly to extend the number of observations at the cost of not controlling for business cycle 
effects. We implement this strategy in order to estimate the model across three different 
samples: High-income, upper-middle-income, and low-and-lower-middle-income economies. 
Given the two different estimation procedures employed, for all three country-groups, we 
obtain 12 sets of estimates, with the averages for the key estimated coefficients of interest 
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summarized in Table 4. For all three groups, all the estimated standing-on-shoulder effects are 
statistically significant. However, the lower income group has much smaller estimated 
standing-on-shoulder effects compared to the other two groups, and there is no positive 
knowledge spillover mechanism between the two variety types. For the upper-middle-income 
economy and the high-income economy, the former has a much significant stepping-stone 
effect, while the latter registers a slightly higher elasticity value of within-variety spillover 
from the existing knowledge stock for both imitative and innovative varieties. In the context of 
development policies, this suggests that vastly different policy prescriptions for economies in 
different income stages. For less-developed economies with inadequate industrial structures, 
the focus of industrial policy ought to be one that promotes development within-industry, and 
when necessary, protectionism measures may be warranted due to the negative spillover effects 
observed across product varieties. On the other hand, for an upper-middle-income economy, 
growth policies need to be designed in maximizing the inter-knowledge spillover among 
domestic industries, as the development of imitative varieties appears to be the seeds to 
indigenous innovation. For a high-income economy, the results suggest an across-the-board 
industrial development strategy, given the complementary relationship between imitation and 
innovation. It also further invalidates Trumpian type of claims that the era of globalisation has 
resulted in developing economies stealing industries from developed economies such as the 
United States. The strength of industrial learning externalities in high-income economies 
remains unrivalled compared to the developing economy groups, and industrial expansion have 
remained robust not just for the innovative industries but also imitative industries based largely 
on standardized manufacturing.  
  
5. Conclusion 
 The main purpose of this study is to estimate the four different domestic industrial learning 
externalities of and between imitation and innovation. Using highly disaggregated industrial 
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data as measures for product varieties, and having developed a theoretical framework to 
provide the necessary analytical basis, we test for the relationship between imitation and 
innovation based on four policy-relevant hypotheses. In sum, we document robust and 
statistically significant stepping-stone effect of imitation on innovation, and a reverse positive 
creative-imitation effect from innovation to imitation, albeit at a slightly lower magnitude than 
the stepping-stone effect. Likewise, we also estimate positive within-sectorial learning effects 
for both innovation and imitation, albeit at lower statistical significance Fostering sustainable 
productivity growth and innovation goes beyond the fixation on R&D funding and patents 
filing, which in turn requires making the right trade-offs in creating an overall industrial system 
that enables industrial learning externalities to flourish. These empirical findings therefore have 
important implications for industrial policies designed to foster innovation-driven growth, 
especially in middle-income and developing economies. 
 First, the direct learning effects within both imitation and innovation are largely positive. 
Although the limited statistical significance suggests that industrial sustainability in certain 
groups of developing economies may be in doubt, hence raising question on the overall effects 
of multinationals' offshoring and plant relocation activities on developing economies' 
long-term economic prospect, the fact that the high-income economies register significant 
positive effects indicates that the growing political rhetoric observed in some developed 
economies (developing economies stealing industries from developed economies) are flawed 
and inaccurate. Second, both the positive stepping-stone and creative-imitation effects suggest 
that both innovation and imitation ought to be complementary. The success stories of Taiwan 
and South Korea likely reflects the respective ability to maximise the benefits associated with 
these two sources of industrial learning externalities. There are therefore inherent merits in 
policies such as export-oriented industrialisation and resource-based industrialisation, provided 
that measures are put in place to support and uplift the capacities of smaller firms to absorb 
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technical knowledge and processes. Third, we also argue that industrial policy emphasis needs 
to be network-based, in that, the maximisation of knowledge flows is more important than 
stock-based policies. This would better facilitate a broad-based domestic industrial expansion 
than overly narrowed and targeted policy focus.    
 Finally, for future research extensions, given that the empirical implementation in this paper 
is largely conditioned by data availability, there are obvious improvements that can be 
implemented. In terms of the theoretical specification, the model setup here neither explicitly 
accounts for the different types of foreign investments, nor the effects of inter-industrial trade 
within an economy. Prior to this study, most of these elements are modelled in the niche area 
of computational general equilibrium (CGE) studies. The rich information on highly 
disaggregated industrial production—hence the different product varieties—are often contained 
in input-output tables and specialised manufacturing surveys. The use of these would allow for 
a more elaborate empirical examinations based on rigorous theoretical growth models of 
variety expansion-based growth, such as one that includes intra- and inter-industry trades, at 
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Innovation Imitation P.capital Growth Innovation Imitation P.capital Growth Innovation Imitation P.capital Growth Innovation Imitation P.capital Growth
Initial GDP per capita (log) -0.078 0.908 1.127 -4.128 -0.632 0.542 1.037 -0.106 -0.271 0.040 1.072 2.629 -2.421 1.952 0.913 1.782
(0.915) (0.573) (0.000) (0.585) (0.001) (0.002) (0.000) (0.874) (0.584) (0.955) (0.000) (0.444) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.202)
Innovation, t (log) 0.959 -3.360 0.886 -0.405 0.913 -2.319 0.959 -0.397
(0.000) (0.079) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.157) (0.000) (0.000)
Innovation, t-1 (log) 0.539 -0.402 0.865 -0.767 0.780 -0.697 0.941 -0.905
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000)
Imitation, t (log) 0.477 1.682 0.943 -0.195 0.684 -0.370 0.959 -0.170
(0.014) (0.403) (0.000) (0.160) (0.000) (0.852) (0.000) (0.209)
Imitation, t-1 (log) -0.389 0.348 -0.819 0.854 -0.569 0.614 -0.785 0.823
(0.032) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.029) (0.051) (0.000) (0.000)
Public capital (log) 0.304 -0.874 6.391 0.601 -0.484 0.721 0.655 -0.405 1.954 2.534 -2.010 -1.294
(0.581) (0.474) (0.186) (0.002) (0.008) (0.294) (0.042) (0.364) (0.184) (0.000) (0.000) (0.380)
D.Innovation [t - t-1] 3.553 0.751 2.368 0.576
(0.034) (0.003) (0.149) (0.082)
D.Imitation [t - t-1] 0.031 1.136 1.908 1.281
(0.982) (0.000) (0.139) (0.000)
Country Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Countries/Observations 68/235 68/235 94/403 80/309 69/236 69/236 69/236 69/236 66/220 66/220 88/369 73/282 67/221 67/221 67/221 67/221
R
2 0.963 0.944 0.943 0.412 0.871 0.843 0.939 0.280
Number of Instruments 37 37 46 42 32 32 39 34
Hansen J-statistics (p-value) 0.779 0.394 0.859 0.690 0.832 0.760 0.185 0.192
AR(2) test (p-value) 0.210 0.407 0.149 0.122 0.703 0.511 0.105 0.211
Innovation Imitation P.capital Growth Innovation Imitation P.capital Growth Innovation Imitation P.capital Growth Innovation Imitation P.capital Growth
Initial GDP per capita (log) -0.980 0.546 1.127 -3.984 -0.754 0.660 1.020 0.143 0.365 0.310 1.072 -2.501 1.803 -1.546 0.920 2.731
(0.666) (0.682) (0.000) (0.423) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.841) (0.666) (0.528) (0.000) (0.570) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.060)
Innovation, t (log) 0.567 0.995 0.619 -0.143 0.577 -0.384 0.678 -0.140
(0.001) (0.449) (0.000) (0.211) (0.004) (0.840) (0.000) (0.228)
Innovation, t-1 (log) 0.197 -0.302 0.789 -0.483 0.850 -0.599 0.861 -0.581
(0.478) (0.099) (0.000) (0.000) (0.011) (0.062) (0.000) (0.000)
Imitation, t (log) 1.054 -3.527 1.319 -0.497 1.066 -1.858 1.335 -0.440
(0.000) (0.005) (0.000) (0.016) (0.000) (0.563) (0.000) (0.060)
Imitation, t-1 (log) -0.114 0.383 -0.905 0.679 -0.872 0.589 -1.090 0.811
(0.855) (0.036) (0.000) (0.000) (0.034) (0.104) (0.000) (0.000)
Public capital (log) 1.021 -0.319 4.360 0.574 -0.486 0.411 -0.660 -0.026 3.940 -2.052 1.767 -2.433
(0.523) (0.803) (0.357) (0.027) (0.008) (0.544) (0.182) (0.930) (0.136) (0.000) (0.000) (0.106)
D.Innovation [t - t-1] 1.046 0.316 6.039 0.059
(0.281) (0.126) (0.070) (0.822)
D.Imitation [t - t-1] 2.553 1.905 -2.472 2.307
(0.106) (0.000) (0.469) (0.000)
Country Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Countries/Observations 72/243 72/243 94/403 85/329 72/243 72/243 72/243 72/243 68/225 68/225 88/369 78/295 68/226 68/226 68/226 68/226
R
2 0.943 0.953 0.941 0.419 0.877 0.874 0.939 0.140
Number of Instruments 38 38 46 44 32 32 39 34
Hansen J-statistics (p-value) 0.555 0.697 0.859 0.434 0.356 0.676 0.185 0.167
AR(2) test (p-value) 0.165 0.223 0.149 0.106 0.701 0.528 0.105 0.754
Parantheses denote p-values. For System-GMM, the test statistics are calculated based on the Windmeijer robust standard errors. The AR(2) test refers to the Arellano-Bond test for autocorrelations.
Estimated coefficients for non-innovation, non-imitation, and non-public capital variables are not presented to improve clarity of presentation.
Table 1: Benchmark Results, where total value added are used as product variety measures 
3SLS, with FE
Innov1 & Imit1, with IMF public capital stock measure Innov1 & Imit1, with public infrastructure stock (proxied by telephone measure)
Innov2 & Imit2, with IMF public capital stock measure Innov2 & Imit2, with public infrastructure stock (proxied by telephone measure)
System GMM 3SLS, with FE
System GMM 3SLS, with FE System GMM




Innovation Imitation P.capital Growth Innovation Imitation P.capital Growth Innovation Imitation P.capital Growth Innovation Imitation P.capital Growth
Initial GDP per capita (log) -0.025 0.210 1.127 -2.663 0.846 -0.772 1.023 0.188 -0.572 0.083 1.072 -0.903 -1.850 1.555 0.917 2.149
(0.981) (0.834) (0.000) (0.192) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.787) (0.613) (0.844) (0.000) (0.867) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.112)
Innovation, t (log) 0.967 0.164 1.015 -0.467 0.720 -1.946 1.130 -0.293
(0.000) (0.854) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.579) (0.000) (0.045)
Innovation, t-1 (log) 0.371 -0.237 0.833 -0.871 0.796 -0.733 0.864 -0.984
(0.090) (0.262) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.024) (0.000) (0.000)
Imitation, t (log) 0.487 1.264 0.789 -0.149 0.649 0.053 0.791 -0.185
(0.013) (0.158) (0.000) (0.296) (0.000) (0.990) (0.000) (0.161)
Imitation, t-1 (log) -0.164 0.384 -0.640 0.816 -0.572 0.978 -0.670 0.849
(0.375) (0.101) (0.000) (0.000) (0.006) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Public capital (log) 0.349 -0.540 2.746 -0.762 0.746 0.371 0.197 -0.381 3.280 2.060 -1.718 -1.874
(0.680) (0.609) (0.663) (0.000) (0.001) (0.584) (0.467) (0.348) (0.255) (0.000) (0.000) (0.204)
D.Innovation [t - t-1] 0.186 1.335 0.536 2.063
(0.746) (0.000) (0.878) (0.000)
D.Imitation [t - t-1] 0.657 0.784 2.945 0.269
(0.150) (0.002) (0.401) (0.328)
Country Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Countries/Observations 72/245 72/245 94/403 87/333 73/246 73/246 73/246 73/246 68/227 68/227 88/369 79/298 69/228 69/228 69/228 69/228
R
2 0.952 0.925 0.942 0.416 0.879 0.870 0.939 0.233
Number of Instruments 38 38 46 44 32 32 39 34
Hansen J-statistics (p-value) 0.703 0.625 0.859 0.508 0.631 0.176 0.185 0.196
AR(2) test (p-value) 0.427 0.359 0.149 0.158 0.156 0.258 0.105 0.173
Innovation Imitation P.capital Growth Innovation Imitation P.capital Growth Innovation Imitation P.capital Growth Innovation Imitation P.capital Growth
Initial GDP per capita (log) 0.442 -0.181 1.127 7.149 0.545 -0.266 1.019 0.256 0.366 -0.330 1.072 -1.994 -1.679 1.153 0.920 1.620
(0.645) (0.883) (0.000) (0.130) (0.016) (0.197) (0.000) (0.716) (0.107) (0.518) (0.000) (0.593) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.242)
Innovation, t (log) 0.651 -4.102 0.781 -0.452 0.687 -5.278 0.921 -0.251
(0.000) (0.065) (0.000) (0.010) (0.000) (0.130) (0.000) (0.151)
Innovation, t-1 (log) 0.424 -0.309 0.731 -0.604 0.592 -0.718 0.822 -0.771
(0.072) (0.141) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Imitation, t (log) 0.870 0.797 0.914 -0.198 0.902 3.956 0.947 -0.250
(0.000) (0.733) (0.000) (0.198) (0.000) (0.228) (0.000) (0.081)
Imitation, t-1 (log) -0.550 0.582 -0.699 0.782 -0.844 1.086 -0.772 0.823
(0.071) (0.039) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Public capital (log) -0.073 -0.019 -3.573 -0.407 0.243 0.314 0.131 0.042 4.939 1.883 -1.273 -1.319
(0.928) (0.984) (0.262) (0.091) (0.264) (0.641) (0.491) (0.904) (0.054) (0.000) (0.000) (0.374)
D.Innovation [t - t-1] 2.890 0.980 1.315 1.645
(0.016) (0.000) (0.704) (0.000)
D.Imitation [t - t-1] 1.495 1.147 1.510 0.560
(0.000) (0.000) (0.689) (0.056)
Country Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Countries/Observations 72/245 72/245 94/403 86/330 73/246 73/246 73/246 73/246 68/227 68/227 88/369 78/297 69/228 69/228 69/228 69/228
R
2 0.946 0.944 0.942 0.422 0.884 0.909 0.940 0.309
Number of Instruments 38 38 46 44 32 32 39 34
Hansen J-statistics (p-value) 0.220 0.669 0.859 0.234 0.558 0.474 0.185 0.179
AR(2) test (p-value) 0.377 0.126 0.149 0.130 0.597 0.284 0.105 0.537
Parantheses denote p-values. For System-GMM, the test statistics are calculated based on the Windmeijer robust standard errors. The AR(2) test refers to the Arellano-Bond test for autocorrelations.
Estimated coefficients for non-innovation, non-imitation, and non-public capital variables are not presented to improve clarity of presentation.
Table 2: Benchmark Results, where total value added are used as product variety measures (cont.) 
3SLS, with FE
Innov3 & Imit3, with IMF public capital stock measure Innov3 & Imit3, with public infrastructure stock (proxied by telephone measure)
Innov4 & Imit4, with IMF public capital stock measure Innov4 & Imit4, with public infrastructure stock (proxied by telephone measure)
System GMM 3SLS, with FE
System GMM 3SLS, with FE System GMM




Innovation Imitation P.capital Growth Innovation Imitation P.capital Growth Innovation Imitation P.capital Growth Innovation Imitation P.capital Growth
Initial GDP per capita (log) 0.334 -0.405 1.127 6.512 0.938 -0.772 1.024 0.136 0.133 0.137 1.072 -2.411 -1.611 1.121 0.920 2.119
(0.779) (0.723) (0.000) (0.021) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.848) (0.521) (0.785) (0.000) (0.489) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.131)
Innovation, t (log) 0.663 -3.577 0.822 -0.465 0.720 -4.400 0.947 -0.275
(0.000) (0.049) (0.000) (0.007) (0.000) (0.220) (0.000) (0.112)
Innovation, t-1 (log) 0.325 -0.313 0.767 -0.655 0.537 -0.685 0.826 -0.794
(0.096) (0.201) (0.000) (0.000) (0.021) (0.013) (0.000) (0.000)
Imitation, t (log) 0.626 0.225 0.943 -0.204 0.840 3.119 0.938 -0.242
(0.004) (0.905) (0.000) (0.209) (0.000) (0.407) (0.000) (0.108)
Imitation, t-1 (log) -0.376 0.627 -0.718 0.771 -0.656 0.918 -0.767 0.824
(0.137) (0.035) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Public capital (log) 0.149 0.163 -2.892 -0.841 0.729 0.453 0.288 -0.415 4.701 1.801 -1.235 -1.846
(0.874) (0.852) (0.286) (0.001) (0.001) (0.510) (0.272) (0.279) (0.056) (0.000) (0.000) (0.219)
D.Innovation [t - t-1] 2.772 1.036 0.954 1.758
(0.011) (0.000) (0.803) (0.000)
D.Imitation [t - t-1] 1.441 1.043 1.676 0.441
(0.003) (0.002) (0.698) (0.136)
Country Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Countries/Observations 72/245 72/245 94/403 86/330 73/246 73/246 73/246 73/246 68/227 68/227 88/369 78/297 69/228 69/228 69/228 69/228
R
2 0.934 0.930 0.942 0.411 0.893 0.915 0.940 0.236
Number of Instruments 38 38 46 44 32 32 39 34
Hansen J-statistics (p-value) 0.302 0.297 0.859 0.226 0.363 0.390 0.185 0.148
AR(2) test (p-value) 0.261 0.175 0.149 0.108 0.960 0.348 0.105 0.356
Innovation Imitation P.capital Growth Innovation Imitation P.capital Growth Innovation Imitation P.capital Growth Innovation Imitation P.capital Growth
Initial GDP per capita (log) 0.324 0.368 1.127 -2.448 1.648 -2.055 1.048 -1.293 -0.132 -0.134 1.072 -6.400 0.636 -0.995 0.927 0.124
(0.700) (0.820) (0.000) (0.694) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.064) (0.755) (0.898) (0.000) (0.140) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.933)
Innovation, t (log) 0.983 0.313 1.077 -0.103 0.956 -0.607 1.089 -0.186
(0.000) (0.887) (0.000) (0.517) (0.000) (0..866) (0.000) (0.247)
Innovation, t-1 (log) 0.364 -0.606 0.867 -0.942 0.065 -0.356 0.853 -0.925
(0.215) (0.117) (0.000) (0.000) (0.844) (0.540) (0.000) (0.000)
Imitation, t (log) 0.807 -1.657 0.861 -0.495 0.890 0.607 0.833 -0.266
(0.000) (0.372) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.767) (0.000) (0.163)
Imitation, t-1 (log) -0.338 0.556 -0.620 0.719 -0.157 0.476 -0.724 0.855
(0.173) (0.130) (0.000) (0.000) (0.590) (0.055) (0.000) (0.000)
Public capital (log) -0.322 -0.048 2.452 -1.713 2.141 1.689 0.168 0.056 5.460 -0.674 1.089 0.234
(0.663) (0.964) (0.541) (0.000) (0.000) (0.016) (0.472) (0.900) (0.007) (0.000) (0.000) (0.878)
D.Innovation [t - t-1] 2.866 2.129 5.091 1.886
(0.102) (0.000) (0.183) (0.000)
D.Imitation [t - t-1] 0.454 -0.038 -3.824 0.091
(0.817) (0.889) (0.169) (0.795)
Country Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Countries/Observations 68/236 68/236 94/403 83/316 69/237 69/237 69/237 69/237 65/220 65/220 88/369 76/284 66/221 66/221 66/221 66/221
R
2 0.866 0.848 0.940 0.307 0.951 0.939 0.941 0.418
Number of Instruments 37 37 46 42 32 32 39 34
Hansen J-statistics (p-value) 0.434 0.149 0.859 0.130 0.628 0.600 0.185 0.308
AR(2) test (p-value) 0.885 0.382 0.149 0.272 0.291 0.482 0.105 0.306
Parantheses denote p-values. For System-GMM, the test statistics are calculated based on the Windmeijer robust standard errors. The AR(2) test refers to the Arellano-Bond test for autocorrelations.
Estimated coefficients for non-innovation, non-imitation, and non-public capital variables are not presented to improve clarity of presentation.
Table 3: Benchmark Results, where total value added are used as product variety measures (cont.) 
3SLS, with FE
Innov5 & Imit5, with IMF public capital stock measure Innov5 & Imit5, with public infrastructure stock (proxied by telephone measure)
Innov6 & Imit6, with IMF public capital stock measure Innov6 & Imit6, with public infrastructure stock (proxied by telephone measure)
System GMM 3SLS, with FE
System GMM 3SLS, with FE System GMM













Low-and-lower-middle-income economies 0.542 0.513 -0.924 -0.464
n= 67
Upper-middle-income economies 0.798 0.845 0.158 0.093
n=217
High-income economies 0.858 0.861 0.054 0.100
n=334
 The averages are calculated based on the 12 sets of estimates for the respective groups. 
Table 4: Annual Regressions - Estimated elasticities, by stage of development/income 
grouping (averages, using total value added as product variety measures)
Standing-on-
shoulder  effects
 Given only regressions with annual intervals are implemented, the dynamic multipliers for the stepping-stone 
and creative-imitation  effects are not calculated.
